This paper estimates the effects of motherhood timing on female career path, using national panel data from the NLSY79, and biological fertility shocks as instrumental variables for the age at which a woman bears her first child. Motherhood delay leads to a substantial increase in career earnings, a smaller increase in wage rates, and an increase in career hours worked. The postponement wage premium is largest for college-educated women, and those in professional, managerial, and clerical occupations.
Introduction
Delayed motherhood is associated with higher female career achievement in both cross-sectional and time-series comparisons. Fertility delay has been increasing concurrently with female education, labor force participation, and earnings in Europe since 1960 (Gustafsson, 2001) , and in the United States since the post-war baby boom (Chen and Morgan, 1991; Caucutt et al., 2002) . Hofferth (1984) noted the cross-sectional correlation almost two decades ago in data from the 1976 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Women who bore their first child after age 30 enjoyed higher wage rates and accumulated more wealth by age 60 than earlier child-bearers and childless women.
An analogous relationship is evident for the more recent cohort of women in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 sample (NLSY79). The first five figures of this paper chart career profiles in median earnings, hours worked, and wage rates for women grouped by the age at which they first gave birth (A1B). Figure 1 shows the progression of raw log-earnings over time, while Figure 2 is adjusted for differences in education, race, ability (Armed Forces Qualification Test score) and birth year cohort. Since hours are substantially different across the groups, as shown in Figure 3 , log-wage rates may be a more appropriate focus; these are depicted in Figures 4 and 5. Even in Figure 5 , with adjusted values, mothers with age at first birth (A1B) in the range 30 to 34 outperform childless women and the two groups of earlier mothers (A1B 20 to 24 and A1B 25 to 30) by the age of 35. Differences in wage rates and wage growth rates are apparent in Figure 5 even prior to childbearing, implying a role for unobserved variables such as ambition or productivity to explain the correlation between delayed motherhood and earnings.
Without further evidence, the correlation can be attributed to motherhood delay affecting earnings, anticipated earnings affecting motherhood delay, or some outside factor influencing both. This paper will attempt to isolate the first two effects. In defining the effect of delay, I propose the following thought experiment: a particular woman, with a given level of ability, career motivation, labor force attachment and education, wants to have a single child, and to spend a fixed amount of time out of the labor market caring for her child. The question is how much does timing itself -the choice between having her child at age 24 versus age 27 -influence subsequent wage rates and lifetime earning potential, holding all other factors fixed? Turning to the converse question, I ask: how does a woman's earning potential affect her choice of motherhood timing? Consider two identical women, who differ only in their potential wage profiles. Does the woman who anticipates higher earnings prefer to delay motherhood longer?
Both aspects are important for policymakers interested in the timing of fertility and for researchers interested in the effects of motherhood and career interruptions on women's earnings. Some have argued that motherhood may be the remaining obstacle to women's achievement of economic equality with men (e.g. Fuchs, 1988) . Deferred motherhood may be a means of reducing the total penalty.
At the same time, financial rewards to motherhood delay are themselves a component of the work-family conflict. As such, they gauge the difficulties women face in balancing work and family. 1 By measuring a component of the financial incentives for motherhood delay, this research can inform policymakers in their design of fertility-timing incentives. The social and private costs from "late" motherhood have garnered much attention in recent years. Deferred motherhood contributes to a reduction in population growth, primarily a concern in Europe, where total fertility is below replacement level. Gustafsson (2001) points out that average age at first birth has reached an "all time high" in many European countries, accounting for much of the fertility decline, and argues for increased government action. Older mothers may face additional health cost, as detailed in "Delayed Childbearing" (Atlantic Monthly, 1995) . For example, childbearing after age 35 or 40 can be difficult and costly to achieve, and has been linked to a greater incidence of birth defects and congenital anomalies. A recent study (Alonzo, 2002) connects motherhood after age 35 with heightened risks of heart attack, congestive heart failure, high blood pressure, diabetes and dental and vision problems.
2 Hewlett (2002) claims that young women have been misled into believing that fertility deferment is costless, and as a result, come to regret the family sacrifices they make for professional success.
This paper will not discuss costs or solve for a private or social optimal timing of motherhood.
Instead, it focuses on measuring the career rewards for delay, and the fertility response to potential earnings. Policymakers concerned with fertility deferment can use these estimates to understand how much of the delay arises from career concerns, and to design appropriate incentives, potentially targeted at different populations of women. Young women planning their future fertility can consider the results as an input into their personal optimal timing. Reliable estimates of the costs and benefits of deferred motherhood, concerning either medical or financial components, are valuable to women and men.
The core result of the paper is that fertility delay influences career path, and career potential affects fertility timing. A year of delayed fertility leads to a 9% increase in career earnings, a 5% increase in career work experience, and a 3% increase in career average wage rate. The effects are not the same for all women, and women with college degrees, and those in professional and managerial occupations receive the greatest returns. Surprisingly, family leave laws are not shown to alleviate the tradeoff. Panel estimation reveals evidence of both fixed wage penalties and lower returns to experience for mothers, and suggests that these costs are lower for older mothers. Finally, using measured aptitude level as an instrumental variable for expected future earnings, I show that higher expected career earnings lead mothers to postpone childbearing, where a doubling of earnings is associated with about a year and a half of delay.
Related Literature
This paper presents new evidence concerning how labor markets respond to motherhood by exploring the effects of timing on the career costs of childbearing. The wage differential between mothers 2 On the other hand, later mothers experienced reduced risks of stroke and bladder infection.
and childless women has been termed the "family gap" and studied extensively by sociologists and economists (e.g. Cramer, 1980; Browning, 1992; Joshi et al., 1998; Waldfogel, 1998; Dankmeyer, 1996; Budig and England, 2001) . Korenman and Neumark (1992) describes how unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous fertility present obstacles to drawing causal inference from cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates. They estimate the family gap using OLS, first-differences and instrumental variables (IV) using National Longitudinal Surveys 1968 (NLS68) data. Their instrumental variables are proxies for family background and for "beliefs and expectations." 3 The major weakness of these instruments is that, while they may predict motherhood, there are few a priori reasons to exclude them from the wage equation. A recent study by Simonsen and Skipper (2003) measures the family gap using propensity score matching, a procedure that is more flexible regarding functional form than OLS, but which also depends on motherhood being conditionally independent of wages or on finding a valid exclusion restriction. 4 Biological fertility events associated with twins (Bronars and Grogger, 1994) and sex ratios (Angrist and Evans, 1998) have been exploited as instrumental variables for number of children in the wage equation, but they cannot be used to identify the effects of delaying or avoiding childbearing.
Section 7.2 of this paper estimates the effects of motherhood on the wages profile using biological fertility shocks as instrumental variables.
Another approach to measuring motherhood costs has been to focus on career interruptions as the central cause. Mincer and Polacheck (1974) and Mincer and Ofek (1982) describe the role of human capital investment during work years, and find evidence of its depreciation during career interruptions for women in the NLS68. Depreciation rises with education level, and is higher for women with more years of experience at the time of their interruption. 5 Using data from the more recent NLSY79, Baum (2002) finds evidence of depreciation, but only among women who switched employers. Albrecht et al. (1999) reproduces the result with Swedish data, and argues for the importance of asymmetric information and signaling in the costs of career interruptions. They find that interruption type, and not simply duration, determines the wage penalty, and that family leave is more harmful to men than to women. While the findings of "depreciation" are generally consistent, an alternative interpretation is that women choose to have children at times when they expect lower wages. Gronau (1988) notes this problem, and discusses the challenge in identifying causal effects between wage differentials and career interruptions.
The impact of motherhood timing itself has also received attention in several studies using similar estimation methods as those used to measure the family gap. The finding in Hofferth (1983) depends on the assumption that motherhood timing is exogenous, conditional on covariates, in her cross-sectional data. Taniguchi (1999) uses (NLS68) longitudinal data and controls for fixed individual differences in earnings. Since age at first birth is static over time, her variable of interest is the product of A1B category indicators and number of children: she finds that motherhood penalties are largest for women who begin childbearing between 20 and 27, are lower for teen mothers, and are negligible for older mothers. While the fixed effects absorb variation that is expressed through vertical shifts of the age-wage profile, the technique fails to account for other differences in wage profiles or for responsiveness of motherhood timing to career outcomes. Another weakness of this and similar studies is the inclusion of work experience or tenure as an exogenous control variable, an inclusion that alters the effective definition of the motherhood penalty and potentially introduces new bias.
As in the family gap literature, the IV studies use socioeconomic background and "beliefs" as instrumental variables (Blackburn et al., 1993; Chandler et al., 1994; and Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel, 2003) . 6 The instruments are susceptible to similar criticism here, as there is little reason to assume that they influence fertility timing but not wage rates. Further, since women are generally aware of these factors early in life, they may respond to fertility timing expectations through career choice or unobservable investments that in turn influence wages. Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel (2003) finds that delaying motherhood past age 30 eliminates the family gap, but only for college-educated women. A similar interaction between education and motherhood delay is presented in Section 7.1. The other two studies deemphasize their IV results. Blackburn et al. (1993) finds no effect of motherhood delay on earnings using IV. Chandler et al. (1994) reports OLS findings of a 1% wage benefit per year of delay, and describes the IV estimates as similar, but sensitive to model specification.
This paper contributes an approach to identification using biological fertility shocks as instrumental variables for fertility timing in the career outcome equations. 7 The strategy is similar in spirit to Hotz et al. (1999) , who use miscarriage (spontaneous abortion) as a natural experiment to consider the impact of teenage motherhood. While they find no benefit from motherhood delay, their results need not extend to later delays, as older mothers face substantially different constraints in career and family; older mothers tend to have higher earnings potential and their motherhood timing conflicts are more likely to involve work than school. The instrumental variables in this paper are: (1) whether first pregnancy ended in miscarriage, (2) whether conception of first child occurred while using contraception, and (3) duration, in years, of conception attempt prior to first birth. These factors each shift a woman's actual age at first birth away from her preferred age. They are plausibly exogenous to earnings potential, and largely unanticipated.
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Turning to the converse relationship, previous work has associated fertility timing with male and female wages in time-series (Butz and Ward, 1979) and cross-sectional data (Heckman and Walker, 1990) . Happel et al. (1984) finds that women in higher-paying occupations choose longer intervals from first marriage to motherhood, and Caucutt et al. (2002) associates higher female earnings with delayed motherhood. These correlations are similar to the ones noted in Hofferth (1984) , only viewed from a different perspective. In order to isolate the causal effect of anticipated earnings on motherhood delay, I
7 The effects of fertility timing can operate through generic effects of work experience timing as well as channels particular to motherhood. Light and Ureta (1995) find that experience timing is related to wages, and can account for 12% of the male-female wage gap. This study uses fertility shocks to identify the causal effects of fertility timing. The results from childbirth may not generalize to other types of career interruptions, but are themselves of academic and policy interest. 8 The validity of the instruments is discussed further in Section 3. 
Conceptual Framework
In this section, I present benchmark cases to illustrate some potential labor market effects of motherhood. This exercise motivates empirical choices of outcome variables and an investigation of the underlying impact of motherhood on wages. To isolate the labor market effects of motherhood delay, I
focus on scenarios with motherhood career interruptions of fixed duration. Consider the hypothetical woman from Section 1, who has a single child, works full-time until motherhood, takes a year out of the labor force to care for her newborn, and returns to full-time employment. The effects of motherhood delay on her career outcomes are considered under five different scenarios: (1) discounting and no wage growth, (2) secular wage growth greater than discounting, (3) foregone human capital accumulation during labor market absence, (4) a fixed penalty for motherhood or interruptions, and (5) lower returns to work experience for mothers.
In Case 1, the woman discounts future income and works in a setting with no wage growth. The labor market costs of motherhood arise from foregone wages during her absence. The present value of the foregone wages is lower for later interruptions because of discounting, leading to financial benefits to delay. In Case 2, the woman experiences wage growth over time greater than the discount rate, causing a reversal in the financial effect of motherhood delay. Early motherhood is relatively less costly since the price of home time is rising. Steeper age-wage profiles lead to larger financial incentives for early motherhood. In neither of these cases do wages depend on experience or do terminal wage rates vary with fertility timing.
In the next three cases, wages rise with age because of increased worker productivity from on- where Break is the duration of the labor force interruption, T is age at retirement, w(t) are wages for a childless woman, and w(t,A1B) are wages for a mother who bore her child at age A1B. Having discussed discounting above, I set the discount factor r to zero for the remaining cases. The first term increases in A1B, capturing the effect of wage growth in raising foregone wages for later interruptions. The second term deceases in A1B, as the foregone human capital investment is accrued over fewer years for later interruptions.
The equation describes the situation in Case 3, illustrated in Figure 6 , where wages increase with experience, and there are no additional costs to motherhood. The highest curve in the figure represents the uninterrupted age-wage profile. The effects of motherhood are shown, for A1B=23 and A1B=30, as: (1) zero earnings during the interruption and (2) a return to pre-motherhood wage level after the break. Since the profile depends solely on experience, the effect of a break is simply a horizontal shifting of the profile by the duration of the break. Irrespective of motherhood timing, the terminal profile is the same, and terminal wage rates do not depend on fertility timing. Career earnings do not vary with timing either.
They are equal to the area under the wage rate curve, and an interruption is simply the slicing and shifting of the shape. The location of the slice does not change the total area, and the total cost of any interruption is the value of earnings during the last period (equal in duration to the interruption) on the uninterrupted profile. This equivalence does not depend on a particular functional form for the relationship between wages and experience. Case 4 introduces a fixed cost, which can be thought of as a motherhood penalty (lower productivity or employer response to a negative signal) or depreciation of human capital during career interruptions. A fixed and lasting motherhood penalty is represented in Figure 7 by a vertical downward shift in the mother's wage profile. Although terminal wage rates do not vary with motherhood delay, lifetime earnings increase, since later mothers work more years on the higher (un-depreciated) profile. Of course, human capital depreciation may take a form other than a fixed linear drop. Depreciation can be increasing in experience, if the loss of capital is proportional to the amount accumulated, or decreasing, if women with more seniority are better able to protect their human capital assets. In these situations,
terminal wage rates will also vary with motherhood timing.
A final generalization of the baseline example (Case 5) allows for a reduction in returns to work experience following the birth of a child. This is depicted in Figure 8 , where the age-wage profile is flatter following age at motherhood. Several factors can account for the flattening. Mothers may experience reduced opportunities for training and promotion, and find themselves relegated to a "mommy track." 10 Alternatively, older women or mothers may be less adept at developing new skills, and consequently earn smaller returns on their human capital investment. When early career contests conflict with early motherhood, women may benefit professionally by delaying motherhood. 11 In these situations, women who defer motherhood will receive higher earnings and higher terminal wages.
The benchmark cases considered in this section provide a useful conceptual framework, and highlight the potential channels through which timing of motherhood affects earnings and wages.
Motherhood delay improves career earnings if there is a fixed cost of motherhood, a reduction in returns to experience, or discounting greater than secular wage growth. Delay leads to higher terminal wage rates only if depreciation costs are decreasing with experience, or if mothers experience a slope decrease. For this reason, I explore terminal wage rates (approximated by wages at age 34), in addition to career outcomes. Using panel data regressions, I also provide direct evidence of human capital depreciation and slope change following first birth. Section 5 relaxes certain simplifying assumptions by allowing multiple children, interruptions of varying duration, and part-time work. These labor supply effects of motherhood timing are accommodated by providing two specifications: one that controls for work experience, and one in which the total impact of delay is defined to include variation in experience. 
An Instrumental Variables Approach
Although delayed motherhood is positively correlated with female earnings, correlations alone do not to establish causality. The first step in isolating the effect of timing on earnings is to control for observable factors associated with both. This can be accomplished through a variety of estimation techniques that rely on the assumption that A1B is exogenous, conditional on covariates. An ordinary least squares (OLS) approach is to estimate the following equation:
where Y i represents earnings, wage rate or hours worked, A1B i is age at first birth, X i are the control variables, and ε i is the error term. The parameter of primary interest is β A1B , the effect of fertility delay on the outcome variable. OLS and the other methods produce biased estimates if A1B is correlated with the error term ε i .
In practice, age at first birth will be correlated with the error term if unobserved factors that determine wages are correlated with motherhood timing. An example is preferences for family over career that both cause a woman to invest less effort or be less productive at work and to begin childbearing sooner. Conversely, women who are especially career oriented may tend to defer childbearing. Social group factors that affect both family and career choices, and are not captured by the usual controls for socioeconomic background and education, can also produce a spurious correlation.
Finally, women with higher earnings potential and greater financial costs from motherhood may choose delay to reduce the penalty. Figures 1 to 5 of this paper imply that earnings differentials precede motherhood, even after controlling for observable factors. If later mothers face higher potential earnings profiles than earlier mothers, as suggested by the figures, OLS will overstate the earnings benefits of deferred motherhood. Alternatively, if women with higher earnings potential are the ones who have children sooner, OLS will underestimate the effect of delay.
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This paper uses instrumental variables (IV) to identify β A1B , exploiting biological factors that shift fertility timing exogenously to earnings. This method produces consistent estimates of the causal effect if the instruments are valid; they must be reasonably powerful predictors of fertility timing, and must not be correlated with the unexplained part of the outcome equations.
The instrumental variables for fertility timing are:
• an indicator for first pregnancy ending in miscarriage or stillbirth
• an indicator for first pregnancy occurring while mother was using contraception, and
• the lag in years from first attempt to conceive to first birth.
These variables capture random and unanticipated factors that drive a wedge between actual timing of motherhood and the woman's desired or optimal timing. The underlying model is that actual fertility timing is the result of the woman's desired timing and a series of random shocks, including the instruments, represented by the first stage regression:
where X i contains the controls from the wage equation and additional dummy variables for substance use during pregnancy (alcohol, smoking, marijuana and cocaine) and for having reported contraceptive use prior to first birth.
If the instrumental variables are correlated with age at first pregnancy attempt, they may not be exogenous to wages, a possible concern for miscarriage and time to conception, since female fecundity is known to decline with age. However, the drop is highly nonlinear, and is most apparent for pregnancies after age 33, the highest age at first birth included in the sample. 14 Another concern is that miscarriage may be associated with risky behavior. However, medical evidence does not support a strong impact of behavioral factors on miscarriage risk. Rather, over 85% of miscarriages occur within the first trimester of pregnancy and over 90% are caused by genetic defects or other anomalies that prevent the fetus from developing properly (Merck 1999). Miscarriage has been associated with some extreme behaviors such heavy alcohol use or drug addiction. 15 Fortunately, these factors are observed and controls are included in the regressions. While miscarriage may directly affect a woman's psychological state and work productivity, this is more likely for recurrent miscarriage, which affects less than 1% of women (Regan 2001).
Another concern arises regarding the "accidental pregnancy" variable (whether first pregnancy occurred while using contraception); women might differ in their contraceptive practices in ways that are correlated with earnings. In addition to including an indicator for contraceptive use prior to first birth, I
also show in Section 7.2 that the effect of "accidental pregnancy" is not solely a result of differences in type of contraception used. Potential bias remains in correlations between a woman's consistency in her use of contraception or in her time to conception and her unobserved productivity at work. The advantage of multiple instruments for a single endogenous variable is that the system is over-identified and the restrictions are tested empirically.
Finally, the IV technique is easiest to interpret with homogenous treatment effects. The effects of motherhood delay are likely heterogeneous, complicating our interpretation of the β A1B coefficient. In particular, IV estimates the local average treatment effect (Imbens and Angrist, 1994) 
Empirical Analysis

The Effects of Motherhood Delay on Earnings, Hours Worked, and Wage Rates
The empirical analysis begins with direct estimation of the effect of motherhood delay on career outcomes. The unit of observation is an individual woman, and the baseline regression takes the form:
where A1B i is age at first birth, and the X i controls are birth year cohort, education level, race (indicators for Black and Hispanic), and percentile score on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), meant to capture general intelligence. This function is estimated using OLS, and then IV, using the instrumental variables listed above: miscarriage at first pregnancy, "accidental" first pregnancy occurring while using contraception, and time from first conception attempt to first birth. The dependent variable is varied to evaluate separately the effects of fertility timing on career earnings, career labor force experience, career wage rate, and terminal wage rate, as motivated in Section 3. Due to data constraints, "career" earnings are aggregated over the age range from 21 to 34, and "terminal" wages are at age 34.
Heterogeneity is explored by adding interaction terms between age at first birth and education level, occupation type, employment sector, spouse earnings, and family leave regime. In these specifications, the additional instrumental variables are the interactions of the original instruments with the exogenous variables of interest. My hypothesis regarding family leave is that it reduces the returns to deferred motherhood by alleviating the career-motherhood conflict. 
The Effects of Motherhood on Wages and Wage Growth
In addition to estimating the overall career effects and interaction terms, I exploit the panel nature of the data further to uncover characteristics of the response of wages to motherhood. Specifically, I look for evidence of human capital depreciation or other fixed penalties for motherhood, and a reduction in returns to experience for mothers.
The first panel regressions have Ln(Wage it ) as the dependent variable and include controls for individual fixed effects, age, motherhood status, and years since first birth. While more flexible representations are possible, the small sample size forces some parameterization to increase precision.
The first specification includes quadratic terms for wage growth: with the original instruments ( 1 A B i ) to create instruments for the motherhood indicator and interactions with years since first birth. 17 The new instruments are:
, an indicator for Age being greater than predicted A1B,
, the indicator interacted with predicted years since first birth, and 17 The original instrumental variables are fixed for a given woman, and cannot be used in a panel framework with individual fixed effects. Instead, they are interacted with the exogenous regressor Age, which is time-varying, to produce new instruments. The form of the new instruments was chosen to correspond to the endogenous variables.
•
In another specification, the quadratic terms are removed, and instead the effect of motherhood is allowed to vary with timing of first birth. The regression equation is: The next set of regressions uses wage growth as the dependent variable, and allows for individual differences in levels and slopes of age-wage profiles. The unit of observation is still a person-age, but the outcome variable is now the change in log wages over the next three years. 18 I consider the following specification:
where X i contains the usual control variables, and δ t are fixed effects for age to capture nonlinear wage growth. The dummy for FirstBirth is set to one in the year t=year of first birth. β 1 is a measure of the effect of motherhood on wage growth, and β 2 captures the change in this effect by age at first birth. A negative coefficient on β 1 indicates a reduction in earnings growth associated with motherhood, and a positive coefficient on β 2 represents a decrease in depreciation for older mothers. To account for changes in work hours surrounding birth, specifications are also estimated controlling for hours worked during the period.
18 Using two-year and four-year intervals yielded similar but smaller coefficients. 
Joint Estimation of Fertility Timing and Career Outcomes
Finally, I measure the converse effect of potential earnings on fertility timing. The first two results sections will establish the set of career financial incentives that women face in choosing optimal timing. The third section evaluates the responsiveness of timing choices to these incentives. The semi-log form of the wage equation (Equation 3) implies that the absolute financial benefit from motherhood delay [β A1B ⋅(β 0 +β X X i +ε i )] is increasing in earnings potential, even if the proportional benefit is the same for all women (β A1B ), producing a larger "price" effect for higher earners. The income effect from higher earnings could point in either direction, as wealthier women may choose to have children sooner, and the net effect is an empirical question. I use three-stage least squares to jointly estimate the following system of equations:
Timing of Motherhood Equation
where Y i represents either earnings or wage rates, X i contains education, race and cohort, and the error terms ε 1i and ε 2i may be correlated. The exclusion restriction that identifies γ Y is that AFQT matters for potential earnings but not for fertility timing; its validity is discussed in Section 7.3.
Data Description
This study primarily uses data from NLSY79 public use files. 19 The survey includes questions on a wide range of topics, including family background, education, beliefs, fertility and work histories, and annual earnings. It also features a panel structure, spanning twenty years, making it an appealing choice for labor market studies. For present purposes, this source is unusual in combining detailed labor market data with detailed pregnancy, childbirth and contraceptive use histories. Respondents form a nationally representative sample of over 12,000 men and women, who were between the ages of 14 and 22 at the time of the first round of interviews. After 1979, they were interviewed annually until 1991, and then biennially. Since the NLSY is a well-known survey, this section will focus on aspects particular to this paper: sample restrictions and variable construction.
To study the effects of motherhood timing, the sample is restricted to women with at least one child born during the survey period. 20 The sample is further limited to those who had their first birth between the ages of 20 and 33, and between the years 1983 and 2000, excluding teen mothers (studied in Hotz et al., 1999) Survey questions about pregnancy outcomes provide data for the first instrumental variable, an indicator for miscarriage at first pregnancy. For women whose first pregnancy ended in abortion, the outcome of the first non-aborted pregnancy is used. 25 The indicator variable for contraceptive use at time of pregnancy is taken from a combination of two questions asked after each live birth. The first asks if the woman used contraception prior to the pregnancy, and the second, if she ceased contraception prior to conception. 26 The indicator is intended to identify women who first became pregnant "accidentally" and in spite of precautionary efforts. The third instrumental variable, time to first conception, is constructed using biennial information on contraceptive use. Among the group of women who report using contraception at some point before their first birth, a woman's first conception attempt is defined to start 23 See Ruhm (1997) at the first year that she reports sexual activity and no contraceptive use. The lag is defined as the number of years between the woman's first attempt and the birth of her first child. For women who never report contraception or whose first attempt is identified after first birth, the variable is set to zero. A companion dummy variable for "reported contraception prior to first birth" is included to remove the potential bias from contraceptive use. In addition, to account for maternal behaviors associated with an increased risk of miscarriage, control variables are added for substance use during first (or earliest reported) pregnancy, such as smoking cigarettes, drinking alcohol, and using marijuana or cocaine.
The incidence of miscarriage at first pregnancy in my sample is 14%, which is in line with Regan (2001), who cites medical estimates of about 15% of all recognized pregnancies ending in miscarriage.
While a direct comparison of contraception use variables is not available, some general features of the NLSY match data from independent sources such as the Alan Guttmacher Institute and the National Surveys of Family Growth (NSFG). The most popular type of contraception for childless women is the birth control pill, although the pill has been somewhat replaced by condoms for women in more recent cohorts. The dummy variable for unintended pregnancy has a mean of about 0.30 in my sample. This may seem high when compared with failure rates of properly used contraceptive methods, but is lower than the NSFG reported rates of unintended pregnancy (57% of pregnancies in 1987). 27 The NLSY79 also asks if pregnancies were "desired." The fraction of children who are "intended" is quite low. For example, consider responses to the 1982 question (R0769500), "Just before you became pregnant the first time, did you want to become pregnant when you did?" 11.6% of respondents said "Yes," 4.2% said "Didn't matter," 63.8% said "No, not at that time," and 20.5% said "No, not at all." These comparisons provide some corroboration for the accuracy of reported miscarriage and contraceptive use in the NLSY79, and support the claim that biological shocks play a role in human fertility.
Results
27 The difference in rates of accidental pregnancy and accidental live birth can be explained by abortion.
The Effects of Motherhood Delay on Earnings, Hours Worked, and Wage Rates
This section describes the measured effects of motherhood delay on women's career earnings, hours worked and wage rates, as well as terminal wage rates. Results are presented from estimating Equation 3 separately for each of the outcome measures. Table 2 reports career outcomes: delayed motherhood leads to higher earnings and wage rates and more hours worked. The baseline OLS estimate of fertility timing attributes a 6% increase in earnings per year of deferment. The baseline IV coefficient is greater in magnitude, at about 9%, has a larger standard error, and is also statistically significant at the 1% level. The larger IV coefficient suggests women with higher earnings potential are having children sooner, although the relationship is reversed when we consider terminal wages. 28 Later mothers tend to have fewer children by the age of 34 than earlier mothers. To account for this potential difference in labor supply, number of children was added as a control, reducing the coefficient on A1B to about 6%, with a standard error of 0.025.
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If labor force participation is not affected by fertility timing, as in the fixed-interruption cases presented in the conceptual framework, total earnings and average wages should be equivalent outcome measures. However, the IV results about Ln(Hours) indicate that later mothers tend to work more hours during the period. This can be an artifact of the early cutoff (at age 34, where more of the late mothers have not completed their interruptions), or the result of differences in the labor market supply and demand for work by new mothers of different ages and levels of experience. One possibility is that older first-time mothers are more likely to secure childcare arrangements for their infants and return more quickly to fulltime employment. 30 Because of the systematic difference in hours worked, the results about earnings confound several factors. Early mothers earn less, but also consume more leisure and home time. For this reason, it may be easier to interpret results about the average wage rate. The estimates show a 3% increase in wages per year of deferment with a standard error of 0.010. is associated with 9 months of delay, yielding an average delay of 1 year and 2 months at the sample mean of 1.5. Typically, only one of the IVs applies to a given woman, so the instruments are causing about 6 months to a year of fertility shifts. These are small, but not trivial effects that provide identification in the second stage, where the A1B coefficient should be interpreted as the average effect of a year of motherhood delay due to biological fertility shocks. 31 The second column shows that failed contraception predicts motherhood delay best for women using contraceptive foam, or taking the birth control pill, the most popular form of contraception for young childless women in the NLSY79. With only three instrumental variables, weak instruments are not much of a concern. However, it is worth noting that the instruments are statistically significant predictors of A1B and the F-statistic on the joint significance test is F(3,1284)=160. Results from tests of the over-identifying restrictions are reported last rows of Table 2 . Exogeneity is not rejected at the 10% significance level, although the statistic is borderline in Column 7 where log-hours is the dependent variable.
32
Regressions that allow for heterogeneous effects of A1B are reported in Table 4 . Column 2 reports IV results by occupation type. Motherhood delay has the largest, and statistically significant, benefit on the average wage rates of women in professional or managerial occupations (coefficient of 0.047), followed by those in clerical occupations (coefficient of 0.022). Sales and service workers have negligible returns (coefficient of 0.008), and women in crafts and manual labor have marginally 31 Since shocks occur during the entire period, the estimate captures the average effect of a delay across women of different ages. Regressions were run using polynomial terms in A1B to consider non-linearity in the effect of delay by A1B, but coefficients were imprecisely estimated. 32 In a related exercise, the regressions were repeated omitting each of the instruments in turn. Coefficient estimates did not change substantially. As discussed in Section 3 (Case 4, Figure 7 ), in the special case where the only effect of motherhood is a fixed cost of human capital depreciation, fertility timing affects career earnings and average wages, but not terminal wage rates. Table 5 gives results from estimating Equation 4 with wages at age 34, or "terminal" wage rates, as the dependent variable. The OLS coefficient on A1B implies that a year of fertility deferment is associated with a 4.1% increase in wages, statistically significant at the 1% level. The baseline IV estimate in Column 2 is lower, around 2.6% and is less precisely estimated than OLS. Columns 3 and 4 show how the coefficient responds to the inclusion of experience hours as a control, first as an exogenous regressor, and then as an endogenous variable, using the core instrumental 33 In an unreported specification, state laws were ignored, and family leave was presented by an indicator for first birth occurring after the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The coefficient on A1B*(FMLA) is 0.018 in OLS and 0.037 in IV.
variables. The first change increased the estimate of the A1B coefficient, while the second reduced it, and left it statistically insignificant.
The final column shows how a Heckman two-step correction for sample selectivity changes the results. In this case, the probability of working at age 34, and of generating a wage rate observation, was predicted in a Probit regression using all of the controls from the main regression, and the additional participation instruments of marital status and spouse earnings. Some unreported variations were attempted, such as treating A1B as endogenous in the first step, and including higher order polynomial terms of the Inverse Mills Ratio in the second step. Across specifications, the A1B coefficient was consistently positive and around 3.5%. The positive effect of delay on terminal wage rates suggests that depreciation costs are lower for older mothers or that women experience a reduction in wage growth following motherhood.
The Effects of Motherhood on Wages and Wage Growth
The next set of empirical exercises directly estimates the wage effects of motherhood by further exploiting the panel nature of the data. Table 6 contains results from the two primary specifications for log-wages: quadratic returns to age and quadratic effects of motherhood (Equation 4), and linear costs of motherhood allowed to vary with first birth timing (Equation 5). As explained in Section 5.2, standard errors for the IV coefficients are estimated by bootstrapping with 500 replications. The first column presents results using an extended sample that includes childless women, while the other columns present results using the usual sample of mothers. The IV estimates are in Columns 3 and 5. Mother and Mother⋅YearsSinceFirstBirth have substantial negative coefficients, indicating that mothers suffer both fixed costs and lower wage growth. In Column 5, the fixed costs of motherhood are held constant and changes in slope for mothers are allowed to vary by timing of first birth. The coefficient for the women with 20≤A1B<25 is more negative than for the 25≤A1B<30 group, although not significantly so, and the coefficient for the oldest group of mothers is most negative but imprecisely estimated. Figures 9 and 10 show plots of potential age-wage profiles, based on the IV coefficients in Columns 3 and 5. The solid curve represents the wage profile for a childless woman, while the dashed and dotted curves show the expected profile for that same woman, with A1B=30 and A1B=23. The key elements of the figures are:
mothers (1) return at lower wages and (2) experience lower growth in wages following first birth.
Together, these factors cause the career and terminal wage benefits from motherhood delay described in Section 7.1.
The next approach using panel data takes increase in log-wages over a 3-year period as the dependent variable and improves on two weaknesses of the previous approach. First, I relax the assumption that all women experience the same wage growth, and second, I consider actual experience as a driver of growth. The first four columns of Table 7 report results from specifications in which education, race, AFQT and birth cohort separately affect wage growth, while the last four columns are from specifications allowing wage growth to vary by individual. Columns 2 and 6 report results that control for actual experience. All regressions include age fixed effects to flexibly capture nonlinear wage growth.
The first specification corresponds to Equation 6, which constrains mothers to be on the same age-wage profile as non-mothers, but allows for local motherhood costs in the period immediately following first birth, measured by the FirstBirth coefficient. The estimates are easiest to interpret under the model with no permanent slope change from motherhood in Cases 3 and 4 of Section 3, illustrated in
Figures 6 and 7. In Columns 1 and 5, the FirstBirth captures fixed motherhood penalties as well as potential costs of foregone human capital accumulation during a labor market absence. When I also control for hours worked, the coefficient on FirstBirth is somewhat smaller and still significantly different from zero, suggesting that fixed costs dominate foregone experience in causing local motherhood costs.
The negative coefficient on FirstBirth loosely corresponds to the negative coefficient on Mother in the previous table; a temporary reduction in wage growth causes a permanent reduction in wage levels. In Table 7 and that the variation in the core instrumental variables is entirely cross-sectional.
Joint Estimation of Fertility Timing and Career Outcomes
The previous sections demonstrated the existence of labor market incentives to fertility delay; this section measures the fertility timing response. First, I will present supportive evidence of the validity of AFQT as an instrument for potential earnings, and then I will discuss the results of joint estimation of fertility timing and career outcomes.
AFQT percentile is used as an instrumental variable for earnings in the fertility timing equation.
The necessary exclusion restriction is that AFQT does not independently or directly belong in the fertility timing equation, that is, conditional on race, birth year cohort, and education level, that a woman's intelligence is uncorrelated with her preferences for motherhood timing. While this assumption apparently contradicts the empirical fact that AFQT is a strong predictor of fertility timing, the observed correlation can be due to the indirect effect of AFQT operating through potential wages. To determine the relative importance of the direct and indirect effects, I subdivide the sample into three types of women, by their labor force participation status between ages 20 and 34, and I estimate the following equation:
where the effect of AFQT is entered interacted with worker type: largely full-time, part-time, and hometime, and X i includes indicators for type. The estimated coefficients (unreported) are β F = 0.027 (standard error of 0.007), β P = 0.007 (standard error of 0.005), and β H = -0.003 (standard error of 0.006). The trend of decreasing coefficients from full to home groups and the negative coefficient on the HomeTimer group (about a third of the sample) indicate that AFQT does not directly affect fertility timing: as the career channel is removed, the association between AFQT and A1B disappears. A potential weakness of this exercise is that women select into their employment groups, and that tastes for family might be correlated with this selection. Controlling for number of children does not change the qualitative results, suggesting that the sorting is being driven by variation in outside wealth and tastes for leisure, in which case, the results of this exercise support the claim that AFQT does not directly affect fertility timing.
I employ a simultaneous equations framework for estimating the joint effects of timing on earnings and earnings on timing. Results from the three-stage least squares estimation of Equations 8 and 9 are reported in Table 8 . The effect of a year of fertility delay on earnings is about 8%, and the earnings coefficient on A1B is 1.551 with a standard error of 0.396. This converts to a 67% increase in earnings causing a single year of fertility deferment. In terms of the observed wage distribution, an exogenous shift from the bottom quartile (log-wage = 11.94) to the top (log-wage = 12.98), will lead to (12.98 -11.94)*1.55 = 1.61 years of deferment. 34 The effect is statistically significant, and magnitudes are nontrivial, suggesting that, on average, women do consider lifetime earnings in timing their fertility.
Conclusion
This paper shows that fertility timing affects earnings, hours worked and wage rates, and that the effects are concentrated among college-educated women who work in careers with returns to experience and costs of interruptions. Timing affects earnings because the direct effects of motherhood around the time of first birth are lower for women with more work experience at the time of first birth, and because motherhood is associated with a flatter slope in the wage-experience profile. This result adds nuance to the notion of a "family gap" as the difference in wages between a mother and otherwise identical nonmother, since the potential gap varies across women, and for a given women, varies over her career. Two key questions remain: Do the motherhood penalties and timing effects result from labor market responses to generic career interruptions, or are they specific to childbearing? And, can we distinguish cases of employer discrimination against mothers from women's own labor supply responses to motherhood?
Allowing for these limitations, this paper provides new quantitative evidence that can contribute to policy discussion of work-family conflict and the labor market effects of motherhood. It also shows that potential earnings affect fertility timing, suggesting that long-term career factors matter on the fertilityplanning horizon.
34 A similar shift from the bottom to top decile will add 3.667 years of deferment.
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